As learning algorithms are increasingly deployed in markets and other competitive environments, understanding their dynamics is becoming increasingly important. We study the limiting behavior of competitive agents employing gradient-based learning algorithms. Specifically, we introduce a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of learning algorithms including policy gradient reinforcement learning, gradient based bandits, and certain online convex optimization algorithms. We show that unlike the single agent case, gradient learning schemes in competitive settings do not necessarily correspond to gradient flows and, hence, it is possible for limiting behaviors like periodic orbits to exist. We introduce a new class of games, Morse-Smale games, that correspond to gradient-like flows. We provide guarantees that competitive gradient-based learning algorithms (both in the full information and gradient-free settings) avoid linearly unstable critical points (i.e. strict saddle points and unstable limit cycles). Since generic local Nash equilibria are not unstable critical points-that is, in a formal mathematical sense, almost all Nash equilibria are not strict saddles-these results imply that gradient-based learning almost surely does not get stuck at critical points that do not correspond to Nash equilibria. For MorseSmale games, we show that competitive gradient learning converges to linearly stable cycles (which includes stable Nash equilibria) almost surely. Finally, we specialize these results to commonly used multi-agent learning algorithms and provide illustrative examples that demonstrate the wide range of limiting behaviors competitive gradient learning exhibits.
Introduction
As machine learning algorithms are increasingly being deployed in real world settings, understanding how they interact, and the dynamics that can arise from their interactions is becoming crucial. In recent years, there has been a resurgence in research efforts on multi-agent learning, and learning in games. Indeed, game theoretic tools are even being used to robustify and improve the performance of machine learning algorithms (see, e.g., [23] ). Despite this activity, there is still a lack of understanding of the dynamics and limiting behaviors of machine learning algorithms in competitive settings and games.
Concurrently, there has been no shortage of papers on the convergence of gradient descent and its avoidance of saddle points (see, e.g., [19, 21, 30, 47] ). Due to their versatility and ease of implementation, gradient descent, and gradient-descent based algorithms are extremely popular in a variety of machine learning and algorithmic decision-making problems. This holds true in the multiagent setting, where, for instance, there are numerous recent papers in multi-agent reinforcement learning that employ gradient-based methods (see, e.g., [1, 17, 51] ), though a thorough understanding of their convergence and limiting behaviors is still lacking.
Inspired by the recent works that focus on the single-agent case such as [34, 42] and long existing work in dynamical systems theory including convergence of stochastic approximation [4, 5, 9, 10] and urn processes [7, 43] , we investigate the convergence of competitive gradient-based learning to saddle points and other limiting behaviors. Specifically, we are interested in settings where there are two or more competing agents, in potentially uncertain environments. Each agent optimizes their individual objective which depends on the decisions of all the other agents and possibly an external environmental signal. This scenario can be modeled most naturally as a game.
It is common in these settings to consider agents which adopt a learning algorithm for determining a strategy (policy) that governs their decisions. There are many different types of learning algorithms that have been proposed in the literature, several of which have their origins in the single agent-case. We consider the case where the agents adopt a gradient-based learning algorithm, one of the more common approaches in a number of different domains. In fact, in support of the latter point, we show that a wide variety of learning algorithms from different fields fit into the gradient learning framework we present.
There are two points to make regarding this line of research and how it is a departure from the single agent case. The first is regarding the significance of saddle points. Indeed, the situation is much more nuanced in the multi-agent case. In particular, games can be categorized into two groups: general sum games where agents are not direct competitors and zero-sum games, typically reserved for two-player games where the agents are direct competitors. Within these two classes, saddle points have very different meanings. The Nash equilibrium concept [40] is the typical mechanism for charactering the outcome of the players decision-making processes. In general sum games, Nash equilibria are generically not saddle points; informally, this is to say for almost all games, Nash equilibria are not saddle points. On the other hand, in zero-sum games where one agent's cost is the others utility, the fact that the function defining the game possesses a saddle point is equivalent to the existence of a Nash equilibrium which coincides with the saddle point. Hence, for general sum games, we would like to avoid saddle points just as in the single agent optimization case, yet for zero-sum games, we seek saddle points.
The second point relates to the limiting behavior of gradient-based dynamics in games. There is a fundamental difference between the systems investigated in much of the single-agent gradientbased learning and optimization literature and the competitive multi-agent case. As we show in the following sections, gradient-based learning schemes for games do not correspond to gradient flows. This may seem a subtle point, but it it turns out to be extremely important. Gradient flows are a very narrow class of flows admitting nice convergence guarantees-e.g., almost sure convergence to local minimizers-due to the fact that they preclude flows with the worst geometries [44] . In particular, they do not exhibit non-equilibrium limiting behavior such as periodic orbits. Gradient-based learning in games, on the other hand, does not preclude such behavior. This makes the analysis more challenging. Given the prominance of gradient-based learning schemes in multi-agent reinforcement learning, online optimization, and other machine learning contexts where game-theoretic ideas are being employed, it is important to understand and be able to interpret the limiting behavior of these coupled algorithms. Recent works have noted that limit cycles emerge in gradient-based learning algorithms. For instance, in [13] , it is demonstrated that limit cycles abound in gradient descent for traning generative adversarial networks (GANs). Other very recent works have explored the existence of cycles in adversarial learning when the problem is considered in a game-theoretic context [39] , thereby highlighting the importance of understanding limiting behavior other than equilibria of competitive learning algorithms. Dynamical systems exhibiting periodic orbits have long been studied and we borrow tools from dynamical systems theory in order to characterize the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning. Contributions. The high level contributions of this paper are two-fold. On the one hand, we provide guarantees that competitive gradient-based learning algorithms (both with full information and in a gradient-free setting) avoid linearly unstable critical points (i.e. strict saddle points). This has positive implications for general-sum games but perhaps elucidates a direction of further inquiry as to what this means for zero-sum games where saddles are sometimes desired.
On the other hand, we provide a gentle warning regarding gradient-based algorithms in competitive settings. Specifically, we show that game dynamics formed from the gradients of individual agent cost derivatives are not gradient flows and since this is the case, competitive gradient-based learning may lead to periodic orbits. Hence, some care needs to be taken regarding their implementation and the interpretation of the outcomes. We provide ample examples in Section 4 demonstrating that in some of the most common learning algorithms cyles emerge. This also exposes new avenues of research into the gap between multi-agent learning settings that admit gradient flows and those that do not.
More concretely, the contributions of this paper include (i) convergence characterizations for competitive gradient-based learning with and without access to the gradient by leveraging dynamical systems theory, (ii) a new class of games, namely Morse-Smale games, that admit gradient-like flows, (iii) a general framework for modeling competitive gradient-based learning that applies to a broad swath of learning models, (iv) overview of currently popular multi-agent learning algorithms that fit into this theory, and (v) illustrative examples. We note that, in regard to (iii), the framework we provide is general enough to encompass algorithms from different fields all having a similar structure. Significance of Results and Future Directions. Before proceding, we summarize the significance of the results and how they open up new lines of inquiry.
• Saddle points are just as important to avoid in general sum games as they are in optimization problems. This is because generically saddle points are not Nash equilibria.
• On the other hand, in zero-sum games, saddle points are Nash equilibria. While this class of games lives on a set of measure zero in the larger space of continuous games, it is extremely important for adversarial learning, GANs, and other robust/worst-case learning algorithms. In this class, saddle points make up a significant portion of the Nash equilibria a game possesses. In fact as we noted above, for a game (f, −f ), the function f having a saddle point is equivalent to the existence of a Nash equilibrium, although not all Nash equilibria are saddle points. Hence, showing that linearly unstable critical points (which includes strict saddles) are almost surely avoided is a strong result that has significant implications for very prominent and recent directions of research in learning.
• Moreover, unlike the single agent case, gradient-based dynamics for games admit limit cycleswe demonstrate this in Section 4 and this has also been shown in recent literature on adversarial learning [39] and GANs [13] . This exposes a line of research into the interpretation of limit cycles. Work from the dynamical systems community has shown that limit cycles correspond to sample paths of a mixed strategy [8] for fictitious play dynamics in two-player games and, more recently, the question of interpreting cycles in adversarial learning has been explored [39] .
Hence, understanding the limit cycle behavior (cite Benaim and Hirsch showing limit cycles have an interpretation in terms of mixed policies) is an important direction for future research.
• Gradient-based learning is a favored approach to multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), multi-armed bandits, adversarial learning, and multi-agent online learning and optimization and is increasingly being employed in these domains without a solid understanding of how to formally interpret the results. We provide a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning and show that many of the commonly employed approaches adopted in the learning literature conform to this framework. This is true in both the full information and gradient-free cases. Consideration of the gradient-free learning case allows us to apply our results to broad classes of multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms including policy gradient and gradient bandits where only partial information is available. We show that even in this case, for a generic class of games, which we comment on in the next item, linearly unstable behavior is almost surely avoided.
• Morse-Smale games are an important and broad class of games that correspond to gradientlike flows. There are a couple points to make here on the significance of this class of games and the results we have for them. First, it is well-known that Morse-Smale vector fields are generic [27, 41] -that is, almost all vector fields are Morse-Smale and, in the case that the agents' joint strategy space is a compact manifold, genericity implies that Morse-Smale games are open-dense in the space of all games. Morse-Smale vector fields (on compact manifolds) also have a finite number of critical points; hence, our results imply that almost all games on compact smooth manifolds admit gradient-like flows with a finite number of critical points (candidate Nash equilibria) and almost surely, linearly unstable cycles (including equilibria) are avoided under the gradient-like flow. The implications of this result are that competitive gradient-based learning generically avoids unstable limiting behavior including both limit cycles and equilibria. Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some mathematical preliminaries and include a high-level overview of the categories of commonly used learning algorithms that fit into the competitive gradient-based learning framework we develop. In Section 3, we present our main theoretical results for competitive gradient-based learning in both the full information case (where agents have access to their gradients, and the decisions of the other players) and in the gradient-free setting (where the information structure is more constrained). In Section 4, we specialize our results to a number of very popular multi-agent learnign algorithms and we provide several illustrative examples that highlight the different kinds of limiting behavior that gradient-based learning admits. We conclude with discussion of the results and provide comments on future directions in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In the single agent case, the goal of a learning system is to optimize a function f (x) given by f (x) = E z F (z, x). The decision variable x ∈ X represents the component of the learning system which is to be adapted in response to events z ∈ Z occurring in the real world. The loss function F (z, x) measures the performance of the learning system with parameter x and the events z describing the environment. The events z are modeled as random independent observations drawn from an unknown probability distribution D(z) which we refer to as the ground truth distribution. Hence, f (x) is simply the expectation of the loss F (z, x).
There is a natural extension to the multi-agent case. Consider n learning systems, indexed by I = {1, . . . , n}. Define X = X 1 × · · · × X n . and suppose each agent i ∈ I is endowed with a cost function
) where x i ∈ X i and x −i = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) denotes the decisions of all agents excluding agent i.
The agents get different observations about the environment and may also have different distributions D i (z i ) on the environment; however, we note that this framework encompasses the case where z i = z and D i ≡ D for all i ∈ I-that is, there is one ground truth distribution on the environment-and the case where agents get different samples z i from the a single ground truth distribution on the environment D. We also note that agent i may not get precise measurements of the other agents actions x −i .
As in the single agent case, probabilities are used to represent the unknown truth underlying the occurrence of observable events which may now include the actions of other agents, their impact on the environment, among many other features. Using successive observations z i,t , the learning system is able to recover part of this truth in the form of the parameter values x i,t by minimizing the functional f i (x i,t , x −i,t ).
Our focus is on gradient-based learning algorithms. Gradient-based algorithms are given in the form
where D i f i denotes the derivative of f i with respect to agent i's choice variable x i . We provide non-convergence and convergence results for both of the above cases when agents are employing such algorithms.
We consider two broad scenarios. In the first scenario, the ground truth distribution is known a priori to each of the learning systems and they observe other agents decisions. They minimize their cost functionals directly. This leads to a typical full information game for which the notion of a Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the equilibrium conditions of the agents. In the second scenario, the ground truth distribution for the environment is not known a priori and the agents may not observe each other's decision-making policies. This is more like the scenarios considered in multi-agent learning problems.
Example Classes of Gradient-Based Learning Algorithms
We now briefly comment on the set of gradient-based learning algorithms to which the theory we develop applies. In Section 4, we provide more detail on these classes of algorithms and include numerical examples that highlight different aspects of the theory. The classes of algorithms we include is hardly an exhaustive list, and indeed many extensions and altogether different algorithms exist that can be considered members of this class.
In Table 1 , we provide the gradient-based update rule for six different example classes of learning problems: (i) gradient play in non-cooperative continuous games, (ii) GANs, (iii) multi-agent policy gradient, (iv) individual Q-learning, (v) multi-agent gradient bandits, and (vi) multi-agent experts. We provide a detailed analysis of these different algorithms including the derivation of the gradient-based update rules along with some interesting numerical examples in Section 4. Here we simply would like to draw the readers attention to the broad classes of multi-agent learning algorithms that conform to the competitive gradient-based learning framework we develop in this paper.
Let us comment on the importance of a handful of these algorithm classes. First, analysis of scenarios with multiple agents is becoming relevant and even necessary in machine learning as is evidenced by the plethora of recent work on deep multi-agent reinforcement learning [16, 25, 26] ,
Problem Class
Gradient Learning Rule hierarchical reinforcement learning, GANs [13, 23] and decentralized optimization [38] . Gradientbased learning rules are very commonly used in these settings (see, e.g., [3, 17, 37, 51] ), which are generally non-zero sum games between agents having partial information about the environment. The popularity of gradient-based approaches in reinforcement learning is in part due to the fact that they need only local information since they use the gradient and hence, they help address the problem of scalability. Using a gradient-based approach has other benefits such as better convergence properties, effectiveness in high dimensions or continuous action/state spaces, and controlled exploration. Yet, gradient-based approaches often converge to local minimizers, rather than global. The advantages of gradient-based methods have lead to them being widely adopted in approaches to multi-agent learning. As we demonstrate, other challenges arise in the multi-agent setting including the potential for non-equilibrium limiting behavior such as limit cycles.
Gradient Play x
+ i = x i − γ i D i f i (x i , x −i ) GANs θ + = θ − γ∇ θ L(θ, w) w + = w + γ∇ w L(θ, w) Multi-Agent Policy Gradient x + i = x i − γ i D i J i (x i , x −i ) Individual Q-Learning q + i (u i ) = q i (u i ) + γ i (r i (u i , π −i (q i , q −i )) − q i (u i )) Multi-Agent Gradient Bandits x + i, = x i, + γ i E[β i R i (u i , u −i )|u i = ], = 1, . . . , m i Multi-Agent Experts x + i, = x i, + γ i E[R i (u i , u −i )|u i = ], = 1, . . . , m i
Game Theoretic Preliminaries
In this subsection, we overview some mathematical preliminaries from game theory. We denote by {(f 1 , . . . , f n ), X} a n-player continuous game where X = X 1 × · · · X n with each X i a smooth manifold of finite dimension m i . Let m = i∈I m i . For such a game, we utilize the following characterization of Nash equilibria.
If the above inequalities are strict, then we say (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a strict local Nash equilibrium. If W i = X i for each i, then (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a global Nash equilibrium.
A necessary condition for (local) Nash equilibria is that the derivative of each agent's cost with respect to its own choice variable is zero. Critical points for the game can be characterized by the so-called differential game form. A differential game form is a differential 1-form ω : X → T * X defined by ω = n i=1 ψ X i • df i where ψ X i are the natural bundle maps 1 ψ X i : T * X → T * X that annihilate those components of the covector field df i not corresponding to X i .
The importance of considering the differential form ω is that it is coordinate invariant-i.e. differential forms transform contravariantly. This means that even if the strategy spaces are not Euclidean space, the object is well defined and the properties we prove using it hold independent 1. Natural bundle maps are standard geometric objects and more details on their definition and use can be found in any standard differential geometry textbook (see, e.g., [35] ).
of the choice of coordinate chart. As an example, consider a multi-robot reinforcement learning problem where each robot gets to choose the angle of rotation of their arm. In this case, the joint strategy space is a torus, S 1 × S 1 , which is a non-trivial manifold. In this case, for a coordinate map ψ : M → R m , the differential game form has coordinate representation
, where y j i is the standard notion for the coordinates of R m i . A point x ∈ X is said to be a critical point for the game if ω(x) = 0. In the single agent case, critical points can be further classified as local minima, local maxima, or saddles by looking at second-order conditions. Analogous concepts exist for continuous games. As shown in [45] , if x is a local Nash equilibrium for a cost minimization (resp. utility maximization) game (f 1 , . . . , f n ), then ω(x) = 0 and D 2 ii f i (x) is positive semi-definite (resp. negative semi-definite) for each i ∈ I. These are necessary conditions for a local Nash equilibrium. There are also sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria. Such sufficient conditions define differential Nash equilibria [45, 46] .
Differential Nash need not be isolated. However, if dω(x) is non-degenerate for x a differential Nash, where dω =
, then x is an isolated strict local Nash equilibrium. We use the notation Dω to denote the bilinear map induced by dω which is composed of the partial derivatives of components of ω. For example, consider a two player game (f 1 , f 2 ). Then, via a slight abuse of notation, the matrix representation of this bilinear map is given by
We define a saddle point for the game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) to be a critical point x such that Dω(x) is indefinite. A saddle point such that Dω(x) has eigenvalues with Re(λ i ) < 0, i = 1, . . . , n 1 and Re(λ j ) > 0, j = 1, . . . , n 2 with m = n 1 + n 2 and n 1 , n 2 = 0 is a strict saddle point or linearly unstable critical point-we use these terms interchangeably. A critical point is non-degenerate if det(Dω(x)) = 0 (i.e. x is isolated).
It turns out that non-degenerate differential Nash are generic. Hence, by proving statements about convergence for a set of equilibria that are generic we are able to make statements about almost all games in a formal mathematical sense.
Theorem 3 Non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria are generic among local Nash equilibria: for any smooth boundaryless manifolds
Theorem 3 first appeared in [46] for the two-player case, and while the extension to the n-player case is straightforward, we provide the proof in Section A for completeness. Genericity implies that local Nash equilibria in an open-dense set of continuous games (in the C r topology 2 on agent costs) are non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria. Moreover, genericity of non-degenerate differential Nash implies that saddle points for the game (i.e. saddle points for the dynamics induced by the 2. We note that the each fi only needs to be sufficiently smooth in Theorem 3. flow ω(x)) are generically strict saddle points. In other words, there is an open dense set of games admitting strict saddle points amongst the set of games with saddle point equilibria.
We also note that non-degenerate differential Nash are also structurally stable [45] . Structural stability ensures that equilibria are stable and persist under small perturbations. This also implies a convergence result if agents follow the flow defined by the differential game form,ẋ = −ω(x). Specifically, if the spectrum of dω is strictly in the right-half plane (for cost minimizers), then a differential Nash equilibrium x is (exponentially) attracting under the flow of ω [45, Proposition 2] . This, in turn, implies that a discretized version ofẋ = −ω(x),
converges for appropriately selected step size γ. This looks remarkably similar to the gradient-based learning algorithms we study in this paper.
Main Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide the main theoretical results and differentiate those results from existing work. We follow this section with example well-known algorithms that fit into our general theory in Section 4.
Full Information Competitive Gradient-Based Learning
Let us first consider the full information setting where strategic agents observe the strategies or policies-we use these terms interchangeably-of the other agents. That is, agent i observes x −i and they know the ground truth distribution on the environment. Each agent i ∈ I also has their own learning rate (i.e. step sizes γ i ). In this case, we write
where γ = (γ i ) i∈I and, we define γ ω(x t ) to be elementwise multiplication of γ and ω(·). Of course this encompasses the case where γ i = γ for all i ∈ I. We adopt this notation so that we can write things compactly and in a unified way. We require the following assumptions on the cost functions f i and learning rates γ i .
Assumption 1 For each
Note that the norm · 2 is the induced 2-norm; however, all finite dimensional norms are equivalent and, hence, any induced matrix norm could be used.
As an example, consider a policy gradient learning procedure in a MARL setting (see, e.g., [50, Chapter 13] ) in which agents' costs are defined as functions of x i that parameterize their policies π i (x i ) which are distributions on the action space U i given a state s-i.e. π i (x i )(·|s). Then the policy gradient procedure reduces to the above form where x i is the choice of agent i. We provide further details on how policy gradient fits in our framework in Section 4.
We remark that
is very different, however, than dynamical systems which corresponds to the gradient flow of an objective function-that is, gradient-based optimization schemes always correspond to gradient flows whereas games are not afforded this luxury and hence, this makes them a very interesting class of problems to study. In particular, the vector field defined by ω is not necessarily a vector field defined by the gradient of a function.
Example 1 Consider the game on X = R × R with x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X defined by
where agents are minimizers and α > 0 is a parameter. Then,
Transforming the dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) to radial coordinates,ṙ = αr(1 − r 2 ) andθ = 1, it is easy to see that there is a periodic orbit on a circle with unit radius for any α > 0. Moreover, the periodic orbit is a stable limit cycle for α > 0 and unstable limit cycle if α < 0. When α = 0, on the other hand, there are an infinite number of periodic orbits and no limit cycles. Moreover, when α < 0, (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) is a local, stable Nash equilibrium (and a locally stable critical point for the dynamics).
This example indicates that there are a large class of games for which the dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) have periodic orbits. This distinguishes gradient-based optimization from gradient-based learning in a game theoretic setting. We use this architecture for non-cooperative games, combined with well-known dynamical systems theory, to show that gradient-based learning algorithms avoid linearly unstable equilibria almost surely.
We rewrite the game dynamics in the following form
where g : R m → R m : x → x − γ ω(x) and γ > 0 element-wise.
The following result states that the set of initial conditions leading to linearly unstable equilibria is of measure zero.
Theorem 4 Let f i : X → R and γ satisfy Assumption 1 where X = X 1 × · · · × X n is an open convex subset of R m where m = i∈I m i . If g(X) ⊂ X, the set of initial conditions x ∈ X so that competitive gradient-based learning converges to linearly unstable critical point (strict saddle) is of measure zero.
First, it is important to note that differential Nash equilibria are not linearly unstable critical pointsthat is, they are not strict saddle points-and due to Theorem 3, generically, neither are local Nash equilibria. It is already known that non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria are attracting under the flow ofẋ = −ω(x) [45, Proposition 2]. The above theorem says that all other hyperbolic equilibria for the discretization ofẋ = −ω(x) are avoided almost surely.
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on the stable manifold theorem [48, Theorem III.7] , [49] . We provide its statement in Theorem 20 in Appendix B. Some parts of the proof follow similar arguments to the proofs of results in [42] and [34] which apply to single-agent gradient learning for optimization. Due to the different learning rates employed by the agents and the introduction of the differential game form ω, the proof departs from theirs.
Proof [Theorem 4]
We first prove that the mapping g : R n → R n is a diffeomorphism.
We start by proving that g is invertible. Consider x = y and suppose g(y) = g(x) so that
Now, all that is left is to show that g is a local diffeomorphism. First Dg = I − ΛDω(x) and if Dg is invertible, then the implicit function theorem [33, Theorem 7.6 ] implies that g is a local diffeomorphism. Hence, it suffices to show that ΛDω(x) does not have an eigenvalue of 1. Indeed, letting ρ(A) be the spectral radius of a matrix A, we know in general that ρ(A) ≤ A for any square matrix A and induced operator norm · so that ρ(ΛDω(x)) ≤ ΛDω(x) 2 ≤ Λ 2 sup x∈R m Dω(x) 2 < max i |γ i |L < 1 Of course, the spectral radius is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues, so that the above implies that all eigenvalues of ΛDω(x)) have absolute value less than 1. Since g is injective, its inverse is well-defined and since g is a local diffeomorphism in R m , it follows that g −1 is smooth in R m . Thus, g is a diffeomorphism.
Consider all critical points to the game-i.e. X c = {x ∈ X| ω(x) = 0}. For each p ∈ X c , let B p be the open ball derived from Theorem 20 and let B = ∪ p B p . Since X ⊂ R m , Lindelõf's lemma [32] -every open cover has a countable subcover-gives a countable subcover of B. That is, for a countable set of critical points
Starting from some point x 0 ∈ X, if gradient-based learning converges to a strict saddle point, then there exists a t 0 and index i such that g t (x 0 ) ∈ B p i for all t ≥ t 0 . Again, applying Theorem 20 and using that g(X) ⊂ X (which is obviously true if X = R m , we get that g t (x 0 ) ∈ W cs loc ∩ X. Using the fact that g is invertible, we can iteratively construct the following sequence of sets:
contains all the intial points in X such that gradient-based learnign converges to a strict saddle.
Since p i is a strict saddle, I − ΓDω(p i ) has an eigevalue greater than 1. This implies that the co-dimension of E u is strictly less than m (i.e. dim(W cs loc ) < m). Hence, W cs loc ∩ X has Lebesgue measure zero in R m .
Using again that g is a diffeomorphism, g −1 ∈ C 1 so that it is locally Lipschitz and locally Lipschitz maps are null set preserving. Hence, W k (p i ) has measure zero for all k by induction so that X 0 is a measure zero set since it is a countable union of measure zero sets.
The class of games known as potential games are those games for which ω is exact-i.e. ω = dφ for some potential function φ; such games admit a potential function and agents employing a gradient-based learning scheme converge to differential Nash equilibria almost surely.
Corollary 5 Consider the game {(f 1 , . . . , f n ), X} where X = X 1 × · · · × X n is an open convex subset of R m , with each f i ∈ C r for r ≥ 3. Suppose the differential game form ω is exact (ie it is a potential game). Let ν be a prior measure with support X which is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and assume lim t→∞ g t (x) exists. Then, under the assumption of Theorem 4, competitive gradient-based learning converges to non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria almost surely. Moreover, the non-degenerate differential Nash to which it converges is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof Since ω is exact, there exists a φ ∈ C r such that ω = dφ-that is,
so that the potential game case reduces to gradient-based optimization of φ. Moreover, since ω is exact and d
so that Dω is symmetric which implies that all periodic orbits are equilibria-i.e. the dynamics do not possess any limit cycles. By Theorem 4, the set of initial points that converge to linearly unstable critical points is of measure zero. By the above, all the critical points of the dynamics are equilibria. Thus, with the assumption that lim t→∞ g t (x) exists for all x ∈ X, we have that P ν lim t→∞ g t (x) = x * = 1 where x * is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium which, by Theorem 3, is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
The interesting thing is that the agents do not need to be doing gradient-based learning on φ to converge to Nash almost surely. That is, they do not need to know what the function φ is; they simply need to follow the derivative of their own cost with respect to their own choice variable. Moreover, since ω = dφ, then generically φ is a Morse function 3 and, as such, the number of critical points are finite. Thus, Corollary 5 implies that competitive gradient-based learning converges generically to one of finitely many local Nash equilibria in potential games.
Theorem 4 (and Corollary 5) is important since it suggest that gradient based learning in multiagent settings, avoids strict saddles almost surely. For general sum games, much like gradient-based optimization, this is a positive result since in such games saddle points are not differential Nash equilibria and are generically (except on a set of measure zero) not local Nash equilibria. On the other hand, for zero-sum games-a measure zero set of games in the space of general sum gamesthis is a very negative result. A large class of zero-sum games have local Nash equilibria that are saddle points.
Example 2 Consider a two player game (f (x 1 , x 2 ), −f (x 1 , x 2 )) with X i = R. The game Hessian, i.e. Dω, is of the form
The eigenvalues of this matrix are { 1 2 (a 11 − a 22 ± (a 11 + a 22 ) 2 − 4a 2 12 )} This has equilibria with the strict saddle point property on a continuum in the class of zero-sum games.
Consider two-player zero-sum games {(f, −f ), X = X 1 × X 2 }, in which agents are direct competitors. First, it is well known that any saddle point of the function f is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game and if f possessing a saddle point is equivalent to the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6 Gradient-based learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum games converge to local Nash equilibria with the strict saddle property on a set of measure zero. That is, let f : X → R and consider the game {(f, −f ), X} where X = X 1 × X 2 is an open convex subset of R 2m and dim(X i ) = m, i = 1, 2. Suppose that f and γ satisfy Assumption 1. Then, if g(X) ⊂ X, the set of initial conditions x ∈ X so that gradient-based learning for two-player zero-sum games converges to linearly unstable critical points (strict saddle) is of measure zero.
This theorem is quite strong in that it says that for any zero-sum game formed from a function that possess a strict saddle point, gradient-based learning will almost surely avoid Nash equilibria; it is important to note here that strict saddle points are hyperbolic critical points and hence, saddle points are generically strict. Not all local Nash equilibria are saddle points for zero-sum games; however, a large class of these games admit saddle point equilibria. Hence, the above results imply that for a large class of zero-sum games, local Nash cannot be reached.
Since general games do not admit purely gradient flows, other types of limiting behavior such as limit cycles can occur in gradient-based learning dynamics. Theorem 4 nor Theorem 6 say nothing about other limiting behavior. In the gradient-free learning case, we state stronger results on avoidance of linearly unstable periodic orbits which include limit cylces.
Gradient-Free Competitive Learning
The results in this section are significant as they allow us to extend the results from the fullinformation setting to a setting where each agent builds an estimate of the gradient of their loss from noisy samples of the environment given the assumption that all other agents' actions are fixed.
This setup allows us to analyze the limiting behavior of gradient-based learning schemes in MARL, multi-armed bandits, GANs, and online optimization. In particular, we show that with unbiased estimates of the gradient of their loss function with respect to their own choice variable, agents employing gradient-based learning will almost surely not converge to linearly unstable critical points.
This has positive implications for MARL, and online optimization, where saddle points are often undesirable as they are generically not Nash equilibria. For GANs, and zero-sum instantiations of the above algorithms, this result suggests that such approaches will almost surely not converge to saddle points which often are desired since they do correspond to Nash equilbria in most zero-sum games. Further, these results show that stable limit cycles persist when moving to a stochastic update scheme. This explains the empirical results shown in Section 4 and in the literature [13, 29, 36] . It also implies that gradient-based learning in MARL, multi-armed bandits, GANs, and online optimization all admit limit cyles under certain loss functions.
Our setup for the gradient-free case is as follows. Each agent updates their strategy using
whereĝ i is an estimator for
. Note that we denote the implicit dependence of the observation z i on the agents' choices by z i,t (x i,t , x −i,t ). In particular, z i may contain observations of the choices of other agents in addition to some environmental observation or it may only contain the environmental noise. Our theory applies as long as reasonable assumptions on the estimator hold. For example, in policy gradient (see, e.g., [50, Chapter 13] ), explored in greater detail in Section 4, agents' costs are defined as functions of a parameter vector x i that parameterize their policies π i (x i ). The x i 's are the choices in the gradient-free learning setting we consider. It is not necessary for agent i to have access to π −i (x −i ) or even x −i in order for them to get an unbiased estimator for the gradient of their loss with respect to their own choice variable x i as long as they observe the sequence of actions, say u −i,t , of all other agents generated. These actions are implicitly determined by the other agents' policies π −i (x −i )(·). Hence, in this case z i,t (x i,t , x −i,t ) = {(r j,t , u j,t , s j,t ), ∀ j ∈ I} where (r j , u j , s j ) are the reward, action, and state of agent j using the usual notation for Markov decision processes (MDPs).
We re-write the above update for each agent as a standard Robbins-Monroe process given by
where ε i is zero-mean noise, making y i = g i (x i , x −i )+ε i , a random variable with mean g i (x i , x −i ). ε i . We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2
The estimatorĝ i can be expressed as above with ε i,t+1 satisfying the assumptions
s., for t ≥ 0, where F i,t is an increasing family of σ i -fields-filtration, or history generated by the sequence of random variables-given by
Assumption 3 For each i ∈ I, f i ∈ C r (X, R) with r ≥ 2, D i f i is Lipschitz for some constant 0 < L i < ∞, the step-sizes satisfy t γ i,t = ∞ and t (γ i,t ) 2 < ∞, and sup t x t < ∞ a.s.
Let (a) + = max{a, 0} and a · b denotes the inner product.
Theorem 7 Consider a game (f 1 , . . . , f n ). Suppose each agent i ∈ I adopts a gradient-free learning algorithm that satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3. Further, suppose that for each i ∈ I, there exists a constant b i > 0 such that E[(ε i,t · v) + |F i,t ] ≥ b i for every unit vector v ∈ R m i . Then competitive gradient-free learning converges to linearly unstable critical points of the game on a set of measure zero.
The above theorem implies that the stochastic approximation dynamics in (7), describing the competitive gradient-free learning corresponding to a game, avoid critical points of the game corresponding to strict saddles. Proof [Theorem 7] Simple algebraic manipulation of the expression x t+1 = x t + γ t (h(x t )) + t where h : X → T X with h ∈ C 2 and where T X denotes the tangent space with X ⊂ R d shows that the stochastic approximation formulation in (7) under Assumptions 2 and 3 satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 21. This, in turn, implies that competitive gradient free learning converges to linearly unstable critical points of the game on a set of measure zero. Differential Nash equilibria (which are generically local Nash) are stable, and hence, Theorem 7 implies we avoid some subset of limiting behavior that does not include local Nash generically. We note that the assumption E[(ε i,t · v) + |F i,t ] ≥ b i , can be interpreted as a requirement on the noise having a nonzero component in each direction.
Corollary 8 Under the assumptions of Theorem 7, if (7) converges to a critical point, then that critical point is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof [Corollary 8] By Theorem 3, equilibria ofẋ = −ω(x) are generically hyperbolic-that is, det(Dω(x * )) = 0 for x * an equilibrium-and the condition that det(Dω(x * )) = 0 is sufficient to guarantee that x * is isolated [45, Theorem 2] . In particular, generically critical points are isolated for continuous games-that is, games with non-isolated critical points are measure zero in the space of continuous games. Hence, if the learning procedure converges to an equilibrium, it converges to a differential Nash equilibrium which is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
As in the preceding section, we can state stronger results for certain nice classes of games. As we have noted, games not admiting potential functions (which act as Lyapunov functions) may lead to limit cycles. Hence, we use the expanded theory in [4, 7] to show that gradient free learning algorithms avoids repelling sets. To do so, we need further assumptions on our underlying spacei.e. we need the underlying decision spaces of agents to be smooth, compact manifolds without boundary.
Indeed, let X i be a smooth, compact manifold without boundary for each i ∈ I. As before, X = X 1 × · · · × X n . A non-stationary periodic orbit of ω is called a cycle. Let ξ ⊂ X be a cycle of period T > 0. Denote by Φ T the flow corresponding to ω. For any x ∈ ξ, spec(DΦ T (x)) = {1} ∪ C(ξ) where C(ξ) is the set of characteristic multipliers. We say ξ is hyperbolic if no element of C(ξ) is on the complex unit circle. Further, if C(ξ) is strictly inside the unit circle, ξ is called linearly stable and, on the other hand, if C(ξ) has at least one element on the outside of the unit circle-that is, DΦ T (x) for x ∈ ξ has an eigenvalue with real part strictly greater than 1-then ξ is called linearly unstable. The latter is the analog of linearly unstable critical points in the context of periodic orbits.
We denote by {x t } sample paths of the process (7) and L({x t }) is the limit set of any sequence {x t } t≥0 which is defined in the usual way as all p ∈ R m such that lim k→∞ x t k = p for some sequence t k → ∞. It was shown in [4] that under less restrictive assumptions than Assumptions 2 and 3, L({x t }) is contained in the chain recurrent set of ω and L({x t }) is a non-empty, compact and connected set invariant under the flow of ω.
Theorem 9
Consider a game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where each X i is a smooth, compact manifold without boundary. Suppose each agent i ∈ I adopts a gradient-free learning algorithm that satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3. Further, suppose that for each i ∈ I, there exist a constant b i > 0 such that E[(ε i,t · v) + |F i,t ] ≥ b i for every unit vector v ∈ R m i . Then competitive gradient-free learning converges to linearly unstable cycles on a set of measure zero-i.e. P (L(x t ) = ξ) = 0 where {x t } is a sample path.
As we noted, periodic orbits are not necessarily excluded from the limiting behavior of gradientbased learning in games. We leave out the proof of Theorem 9 since, other than some algebraic manipulation, it is a direct application of [7, Theorem 2.1] (which we provide in Theorem 22 in Appendix B).
The above theorem simply states competitive gradient-free learning avoids linearly unstable cycles on a set of measure zero. Of course, we can state stronger results for a more restrictive class of games admitting gradient-like vector fields. Specifically, analogous to [7] , we can consider Morse-Smale vector fields. We introduce a new class of games, which we call Morse-Smale games, that are a generalization of potential games. These are a very important class of games as they correspond to Morse-Smale vector fields which are known to be generic and in the case that the joint strategy space is a compact manifold, this implies Morse-Smale games are open, dense in the set of games.
Definition 10 A game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) with f i ∈ C r for some r ≥ 3 and where strategy spaces X i is a smooth, compact manifold without boundary for each i ∈ I is a Morse-Smale game if the vector field corresponding to the differential ω is Morse-Smale-that is, the following hold: (i) all periodic orbits ξ (i.e. equilibria and cycles) are hyperbolic and W s (ξ) W u (ξ) (i.e. the stable and unstable manifolds of ξ intersect transversally), (ii) every forward and backward omega limit set is a periodic orbit, (iii) and ω has a global attractor.
Example 3 Consider the n-player game with X i = R for each i ∈ I and f n (x) = x n (x 2 1 − 1), f i (x) = x i x i+1 , ∀i ∈ I/{n} This is a Morse-Smale game that is not a potential game. Indeed, x = −ω(x) where ω = [x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n−1 , x 2 1 − 1] is a dynamical system with a Morse-Smale vector field that is not a gradient vector field [12] .
The conditions of Morse-Smale in the above definition ensure that there are only finitely many periodic orbits. The simplest example of a Morse-Smale vector field is a gradient flow. Essentially, in a neighborhood of a critical point for a Morse-Smale game, the game behavior can be described by a Morse function f such that near critical points ω can be written as df and away from critical points ω points in the same direction as df -i.e. ω · df > 0. Specializing the class of Morse-Smale games, we have stronger convergence guarantees.
Theorem 11 Consider a Morse-Smale game (f 1 , . . . , f n ). Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Let {ξ i , i = 1, . . . , l} denote the set of periodic orbits in X. Then
and P (L({x t }) = ξ i ) > 0 implies ξ i is linearly stable. Moreover, if the periodic orbit ξ i with P (L({x t }) = ξ i ) > 0 is an equilibrium, then it is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium which is, generically, a local Nash.
The proof of Theorem 11 utilizes [7, Corollary 2.2] (which we provide in Corollary 23 in Appendix B).
If we further restrict the class of games to potential games, the above theorem implies convergence to Nash in an almost sure sense.
Corollary 12
Consider the game (f 1 , . . . , f n ). Suppose ω is exact (i.e. the game is a potential game). Under the assumptions of Theorem 9, competitive gradient free learning converges to a nondegenerate differential Nash almost surely. Moreover, the differential Nash to which it converges is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof [Corollary 12] Consider a potential game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where each X i is a smooth, compact boundaryless manifold. Then ω = dφ for some φ ∈ C r which implies that ω is a gradient flow and hence, does not admit limit cycles. Let {ξ i , i = 1, . . . , l} be the set of equilibrium points in X. Under the assumptions of Theorem 11,
then ξ i is a linearly stable equilibrium point which is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium of the game by definition. Hence, a sample path {x t } converges to a non-degenerate differential Nash with probability one. Moreover, by Theorem 3, we know it is generically a local Nash.
This result holds because potential games correspond exactly to gradient flows which do not admit periodic cycles that are not equilibria as we showed in the proof of Corollary 5.
Application to Classes of Gradient-Based Learning Algorithms
In this section, we provide derivation of the gradient-based learning rules provided in Table 1 as well as some very interesting and illustrative numerical results from their implementation.
Online Optimization: Gradient Play in Non-Cooperative Games
The third class of algorithms that fits under the general notion of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms are classical online optimization algorithms. In this case, each agent is directly trying to minimize their own function f i (x i , x −i ), which can depend on the current iterate of the other agents. There are many examples in the optimization literature of this type of setup. We note that in the full information case, the competitive gradient-based learning framework we describe here is simply gradient play [18] , a very well-studied game-theoretic learning rule. Here we provide an illustrative example of a game that give rise to interesting limiting behavior. Consider the two player game outlined in Example 1, where we assume players are minimizing the following costs:
For α > 0, these dynamics have a stable limit cycle and for α < 0, there is an unstable limit cylce on the unit circle. Moreover, when α < 0, (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) is a locally stable critical point of the dynamics and a local Nash equilibrium; indeed, the eigenvalues of −Dω(0, 0) are in the open right-half plane which shows it is stable and
which shows it is Nash. In the full information case, the vector field ω associated with this game only has one stable limit cycle, and an unstable equilibrium at x 1 = x 2 = 0. Thus, random initializations will converge to this limit cycle almost surely. This behavior is shown empirically in Figure 1 .
The above example demonstrates interesting limiting behavior of gradient play in the full information case. Perhaps more relevant to the learning community is the gradient-free case. That is, if the agents can query their own function, but perhaps not its gradient, one solution to the online optimization problem is suggested by [15] . The game can be described as follows. At each iteration, t of the game, every player publishes their current iterate x i,t . Player i, implementing this algorithm, then updates their iterate by taking a random unit vector u, and querying f i (x i + δ i u, x −i ). The update map is given by x i,t+1 = x i,t − γ i f i (x i + δ i u, x −i )u. It is shown in [15] that f i (x i + δ i u, x −i )u is an unbiased estimate of the gradient of a smoothed version of f i -i.e.
Thus the loss function being minimized by the agent isf i . In this case, the results on characterizing limiting behavior presented in Section 3.2 apply.
Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks take a game theoretic approach to fitting a generative model in complex structured spaces. Specifically, they approach the problem of fitting a generative model from a data set of samples from some distribution Q ∈ ∆(Y ) as a zero-sum game between a generator and a discriminator. In general, both the generator and the discriminator are modeled as deep neural networks. The generator network outputs a sample G θ (z) ∈ Y in the same space Y as the sampled data set given a random noise signal z ∼ F as an input. The discriminator D w (y) tries to discriminate between a true sample and a sample generated by the generator-that is, it takes as input a sample y drawn from Q or the generator and tries to determine if its real or fake. The generator, of course, wants to trick the discriminator.
This process can be modeled efficiently as a zero-sum game between the generator and discriminator. The goal, then, is to find a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game under which the generator will learn to generate samples that are indistinguishable from the true samples-i.e. in equilibrium, the generator has learned the underlying distribution. In zero-sum games, the Nash equilibria very often correspond to saddle points.
GANs are notoriously difficult to train. They typical approach is to allow each player to perform (stochastic) gradient descent on the derivative of their cost with respect to their own choice variable. There are two important observations about gradient-based learning approaches to GANs relevant to this paper. First, the equilibrium that is sought is generally a saddle point and second, the dynamics of GANs are complex enough to admit limit cycles. Indeed, in a very recent work, it was shown that no variant of gradient descent that falls in the large class of Follow-the-Regularized-Leader algorithms can converge to an equilibrium in terms of the last-iterate and, moreover, such approaches are bound to converge to limit cycles around the equilibrium [39] . Yet, none-the-less, this approach is still very common. In [13] , they further demonstrate that most common modifications to gradient descent such as clipping or adding a momentum term still converge to a limit cycle independent of the choice of step-size.
Proposition 13 Gradient-based learning approaches for training GANs converge to local Nash equilibria with the strict saddle point property on a set of measure zero.
Wasserstein GANs
To prevent instabilities in the training of GANs with zero-one discriminators, the Wasserstein GAN attempts to approximate the Wasserstein-1 metric between the true distribution and the distribution of the generator. In this problem, D w (·) is a 1-Lipschitz function leading to the game
the corresponding gradient-based dynamics are given by
where γ is the learning rate. However, due to the fact that the discriminator is approximating a Lipschitz function, when training the discriminator, the function D w (·) needs to have a bounded gradient. One approach to this problem of ensuring a bounded gradient is to introduce a penalty to the loss function of the zero-sum game. In [24] , they add the 2 -norm of the gradient of D w (x) so that the loss becomes
where Q is the distribution of the random vector x + (1 − )G θ (z) when x ∼ Q and z ∼ N (0, I). Let us consider a simple example which is highly illustrative of the potential pitfalls of naïve gradient-based learning in multi-agent learning. Specifically, consider the Wasserstein GAN which is based on the premise that the discriminator is approximating all 1-Lipschitz functions of the data meaning that the discriminator has a bounded gradient. Here we consider a simple example where the data are generated by a multi-variate normal distribution Q = N (µ, I) with µ ∈ R m . Let the generator, which wants to learn µ, be an additive displacement of some input noise z ∼ N (0, I)-i.e. G θ (z) = z + θ-and let the discriminator be a linear function-i.e. D w (x) = w, x . The gradient-based dynamics for this WGAN are given by
In Figure 2 , we show both phase plots and plots of the trajectories during the learning process for the WGAN described above with λ = 0.2, γ = 0.1 and using v = [1, 2] . This zero-sum game has a Nash equilibrium at (w * , θ * ) = (0, 0, 1, 2). This point is an unstable critical point for the dynamics for any λ = 0. Moreover, as λ → 0, this Nash equilibrium becomes a saddle point. The discrete dynamics (i.e. gradient update ) in this case, however, are unstable for any choice of step size γ. A commonly used approach in GANs is to employ clipping-that is, clip w t and θ t at some maximum threshold. Employing this technique results in the gradient-based learning rule converging again to a limit cycle, however, it is oscillating around the saddle point equilibrium. An example of this can be seen in the right-most plot in Figure 2 . Initializations (circles) converge to a limit cycle and this limit cycle is centered on the Nash equilibrium. The set of initializations that converge to the Nash equilibrium is thus measure zero.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Algorithms
In this subsection, we show how policy gradient applied in multi-agent settings and a more recent algorithm introduced in [51] that is tailored to competitive settings, are gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms. We state our general setup for MARL and derive the loss and the estimator of the gradient of the loss for a given agent i ∈ I in both cases. In our formulation for MARL, agents are all operating in a MDP. There is a shared state space S. Each agent, indexed by I = {1, . . . , n} has their own action space U i and reward function R i : S × U → ∆ R where U = U 1 × · · · × U n . We note the reward functions could themselves be random, but for illustrative purposes we suppose they are deterministic. Finally, the dynamics of the MDP are described by a state transition kernel P : S × U → ∆ S and an initial state distribution P 0 . Each agent i also has a policy, π i , that returns a distribution over U i for each state s ∈ S.
Before defining the objective and learning method of each player, we begin by defining a trajectory of the MDP, τ as τ = {(s t , u i,t , u −i,u )} T −1 t=0 . Thus, a trajectory is a finite sequence of states, the actions of each player in that state, and the reward agent i received in that state, where T is the time horizon. Given fixed policies we can define a distribution over the space of all trajectories Γ, namely P Γ (π), by
The goal of each single agent in this setup is to maximize their cumulative expected reward over a time horizon T . That is, the agent is trying to find a policy π i so as to maximize some function, which in keeping with our general formulation in Section 2, we write as −f i since this problem is a maximization.
MULTI-AGENT POLICY GRADIENT
Let use first consider classical policy gradient [50] . When an agent is employing policy gradient in this MARL setup, we assume that their policy comes from a parametric class of policies parametrized by x i ∈ X i ⊂ R m i . To simplify notation, we write the parametric policy as π i (x i ) where for each x i , given an state s, π i (x i ) is a probability distribution on actions u i which we denote by π i (x i )(·|s).
Proposition 14
Policy gradient for multi-agent reinforcement learning is a competitive gradientbased learning algorithm. In the full information case, under the assumptions of Theorem 4, policy gradient converges to strict saddle points on a set of measure zero. In the gradient-free case, under the assumptions of Theorem 7 (respectively, Theorem 9), policy gradient converges to strict saddles (respectively, linearly unstable cycles) on a set of measure zero.
Proof The proof simply requires us to reformulate policy gradient in the competitive gradient-based learning framework.
An agent i using policy gradient is trying to tune the parameters x i of their policy to maximize their expected reward over a trajectory of length T . We define the reward of agent i over a trajectory of the MDP, τ ∈ Γ, to be R i (τ ) =
Thus, each agent's loss function f i , in keeping with our notation, is given by
The actions of agent i in the continuous game framework described in previous sections are the parameters of their policy, and thus their action space is X i ⊂ R m i . We note that we have made no assumptions on the other player's actions x −i . That is, they do not need to be employing the same parameterized policy class or exactly the same gradient-based update procedure; the only requirement is that they also be using a gradient based multi-agent learning algorithm, and that their actions give rise to a set of policies π −i that govern the way they choose their actions in the MDP.
In the full information case, at each round, t of the game, a player plays according to π i (x i,t ) for a time horizon T , and then performs a gradient update on their parameters where
Indeed, Recall that the function being maximized is given by
where R i (τ ) = tion of the policy gradient:
The first step uses the fact that D x P Γ (τ ; π) = D x log(P Γ (τ ; π))P Γ (τ ; π). The second uses the fact that the dynamics of the MDP and the policies of all the other agents are assumed to be independent and do not depend on x. By expanding R i (τ ), using the fact that
and rearranges terms, we get the expression in (9) for
On the other hand, in the partial information case, at each time t in the policy gradient update procedure, agent i receives a T horizon roll-out, say
, and constructs the unbiased estimate of the gradient-i.e.
We note that in this case, the agent does not need to know the policies of the other agents, or anything about the dynamics of the MDP. The agent can construct the estimator solely from the sequence of states, the reward they received in those states, and their own actions.
With these two derivations of the gradient for the full information and gradient-free cases, policy gradient for MARL conforms to the competitive gradient-based learning framework and hence, the results of Section 3 apply under appropriate assumptions.
MULTI-AGENT LEARNING WITH POLICY PREDICTION
Let us now consider a slight generalization of policy gradient-i.e. multi-agent learning with policy prediction (MAL-PP) introduced in [51] . We use this example to highlight how the gradient based framework extends to more intricate cost functions. We note that this approach was developed for two-player, two-action matrix games, and thus I = {1, 2}. The loss function for player 1 is given by
where the time horizon T = 1. This can be seen as explicitly taking into account the fact that the other player is doing learning of their own. The gradient is calculated explicitly for 2-player, 2-action matrix games in [51] in the full information case. This framework, however, requires full information over the other players policy, parameters of their policy, and step size. None-the-less, the full information results derived in Section 3, apply.
Multi-Armed Bandits: Individual Q-learning, Gradient Bandits, and Experts
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) literature, also has many algorithms that fit into this gradient-based learning framework. We show that individual Q-learning, gradient bandits, and Exp3 (see [50] ) can both be seen as gradient-based learning algorithms.
INDIVIDUAL Q-LEARNING
One of the most basic reinforcement learning schemes for single-agent decision-making is given by
where u t is the action at time t and R t is the reward [50] . There have been many efforts to extend this to a multi-agent setting both in the game-theoretic and computer science fields. The scenario we consider, which was first introduced by [18] , is such that there are n players faced with a choosing from a finite set of actions U i with |U i | = m i repeatedly in time and their goal is to maximize their reward which is a function of all the players actions, i.e., R i (u i , u −i ). Each agent employs the following update (see [36] ):
where π i is agent i's strategy and {γ t } t≥1 is a deterministic sequence of learning parameters satisfying t≥1 γ t = ∞ and t≥1 (γ t ) 2 < ∞. It is fairly easy to see that the above update can be written as player i performing gradient ascent on the reward
and the derivation follows a very similar procedure as in the previous subsection on gradient-based multi-armed bandit algorithms. We leave this to the reader and instead examine the corresponding continuous differential equation which has been shown to have exactly the same critical point set as the individual Q-learning rule. Indeed, it was shown in [6] that the values Q t = (Q 1,t , . . . , Q n,t ) that result from the individual Q-learning algorithm converge almost surely to a connected internally chain-recurrent set of the flow defined by the dynamics
assuming the Q t are bounded for all t and where r i (u i , π −i (q t )) is the expected reward that agent i receives if they play action u i and all other agents have policy π −i . It is also show that the trajectories of (11), the Q-learning dynamics, correspond to trajectories of the smoothed-best response dynamics
where b i (·) is the smoothed best response map-e.g., it may be the Boltzmann distribution
Note that with the Boltzmann distribution as the smoothed best response map, for two-player matrix games, the dynamics in (12) correspond exactly to the logit dynamics [18, 29] . To illustrate the kinds of behaviors individual Q-learning leads to, we consider a class of matrix games known as Rock-Paper-Scissors or Ro-Sham-Bo. The two-player game is a zero-sum game where the general form of the payoff matrix is given by
In essence, the game plays out as follows. Rock, paper and scissors are the choices. Rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock. The winning payoff is δ and the loosing payoff is −ε. In the event of ties, no one gets a reward. The agents choose a strategy (x, y, 1 − x − y) in the probability simplex. The smoothed best response dynamics are given by
exp(β(xδ−yε))+exp(β(−xε+δ(−x−y+1)))+exp(β(yδ−ε(−x−y+1))) − y Independent of the constant β, the equilibrium is the strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for both players; however, the choice of β results in very interesting dynamical systems behavior. In Figure 3 , we show the phase plots for different values of β-note that this behavior persists even for different choices of ε, δ. It can be seen that in the case where β = 10, (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a stable center while, in the case where β = 35, a stable limit cycle forms around (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). In [29] , the authors perform a bifurcation analysis and characterize more fully the limiting behavior as a function of the choice of β. 
GRADIENT BANDITS
To begin with, we can view the stochastic MAB problem as an instantiation of the MARL problem that was previously described, with one state and finite actions. Using policy gradient in this situation, with a particular class of parametric policies gives the gradient bandits algorithm. In gradient bandits, a player i ∈ I maintains a vector of weights x i ∈ R m i , with one weight for each action in U i where |U i | = m i , which is assumed to by finite. Denote these weights x i,1 , . . . , x i,m i . The policy is then assumed to be the soft-max over the weights-i.e. for each action ∈ U i ,
.
Proposition 15
Gradient bandits is a competitive gradient-based learning algorithm. In the full information case, under the assumptions of Theorem 4, gradient bandits converges to strict saddle points on a set of measure zero. In the gradient-free case, under the assumptions of Theorem 7 (respectively, Theorem 9), gradient bandits converges to strict saddles (respectively, linearly unstable cycles) on a set of measure zero.
Proof Just as in the policy gradient case, we simply need to derive the expression for the gradient. Consider the full information case. For simplicity of notation, we will consider player i's weight to be x i = x-that is, we drop the index. The gradient bandit algorithm can be viewed as a singlestate MDP, with T = 1.
Simple calculus gives us that
Plugging this back into
On the other hand, in the partial information case, at each iteration t of the gradient update procedure, the player plays an action u t , receives a reward r t , and calculates the unbiased estimator for the gradient of a single weight x as
With the expressions for the gradient in both the full information and gradient-free cases, it is clear that gradient bandits is a competitive gradient-based learning algorithm. Thus, the results of Section 3 apply under the appropriate assumptions.
For two player matrix games, we can derive the game hessian Dω, described in Section 3.1. With this, we can check analytically the classification of critical points by examining the spectrum of Dω. Let y 1 , . . . , x m 1 be the weights of player 1, and y 1 , . . . , y m 2 be the weights of player 2. Further, let π = (π 1 , π 2 ).
We first find an expression for D 2 x j ,x f 1 by simply expanding the expression for D x f 1 (x, y). Indeed, substituting in for D x π i (x)(u i ), and then simplifying again, we get that:
Now evaluating the expression and simplifying, we get:
We now find an expression for D 2 z j x f 1 in an analogous way.
With these terms, we can completely construct the matrix Dω.
To further illustrate the complex behaviors that can arise out of multi-agent reinforcement learning and gradient-based algorithms in zero-sum games, we make two instances of gradient bandits, with β 1 = β 2 = 1 play a game of Rock-Paper-Scissors as defined in 13, with δ = = 1. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) be the weights for players 1 and 2.In this game, the Nash strategy, x 1 = x 2 , x 3 = c 1 and y 1 = y 2 = y 3 = c 2 for c 1 , c 2 ∈ R, equivalent to π 1 = π 2 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3),can be shown to be a saddle point for the game dynamics by evaluating the expression for the hessian above. In fact, in Figure 4 , we can see how the weights of player 1 evolve in a fixed area centered at x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 4, without ever converging to a cycle or an equilibrium. Figure 4 : Two gradient-bandits instances playing in the zero-sum rock-paper-scissors game defined in 13 with δ = = 1. Both players were randomly initialized, and x 3 = 4 and y 3 = 5 were fixed and not trained to simplify the visualization. For the players' policies, β 1 = β 2 = 1. The resulting game dynamics have both players evolving in a fixed area centered at the nash strategies x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 4 and y 1 = y 2 = y 3 = 3 respectively.
EXP3
Another commonly used MAB algorithm, Exp3 (see, e.g., [2] for more detail), can also be seen as a gradient-based learning algorithm. A given player i using Exp3 maintains a policy over actions, where the policy class is parametrized by an exploration constant γ i , and a vector of weights x i ∈ R m i . We assume the exploration constant is fixed a priori and the agents are optimizing over the weights.
Proposition 16 Multi-agent Exp3 bandits is a competitive gradient-based learning algorithm. In the full information case, under the assumptions of Theorem 4, Exp3 bandits converges to strict saddle points on a set of measure zero. In the gradient-free case, under the assumptions of Theorem 7 (respectively, Theorem 9), Exp3 bandits converges to strict saddles (respectively, linearly unstable cycles) on a set of measure zero.
Proof We simply need to derive the gradient-based learning rule for each agent. Each weight x i, is assigned to an action in U i = {1, . . . , m i } where ∈ {1, . . . , m i }. The policy of the agent is calculated as
A player implementing Exp3 can be seen as minimizing the loss function
The full information gradient for Exp3 is given by
On the other hand, in the gradient-free case, in the Exp3 algorithm, at each iteration, the agent plays an action u t , receives a reward r t , and updates their weights using the algorithm
Note that (r t 1 ut= )/π i (x i )( ), is an unbiased estimator forR i, . Thus, the Exp3 update can be seen as a gradient-free update on the loss f i with step size γ i /m i .
Discussion and Future Directions
We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our results on the convergence of gradientbased learning algorithms in competitive settings which abound in the multi-agent learning literature. We provide a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a number of commonly used methods in multi-agent learning including policy gradient in MARL, gradient-based and Exp3 multi-agent multi-armed bandits, gradient-based schemes for GANs, and gradient-based learning in multi-agent online optimization. We show that linearly unstable critical points are avoided almost surely which has positive and negative implications depending on the game structure. Namely, for general sum games, it is positive since saddle points are generically not Nash equilibria, yet for zero-sum games, it is negative since saddle points correspond to Nash equilibria. We highlight the fact that unlike the single agent case, multi-agent gradient based learning admits periodic orbits that are not simple equilibria-i.e. limit cycles.
We go beyond the full information case and consider gradient-free learning as well. These results are significant as they allow us to consider the setting where each agent builds an estimate of the gradient of their loss from noisy samples of the environment which, in turn, allows us to draw conclusions about the limiting behavior of gradient-based learning schemes in MARL, multi-armed bandits, GANs, and online optimization.
We note that limit cycles persist even in the stochastic setting. To address this, we introduce a new class of games, Morse-Smale games, which admit gradient-like flows and show that this class of games avoids all unstable limiting behavior almost surely. Morse-Smale games correspond to Morse-Smale vector fields which are known to be generic and, hence, our results apply to almost all games. We specialize our results to a variety of commonly algorithm classes and provide a number of illustrative examples demonstrating various limiting behaviors.
We remark that it is extremely important to understand the limiting behavior of multi-agent learning. If one does not know a priori what the game is going to converge to, or what the dynamics of the game can look like, undesirable behaviors could arise, such as unwanted collusion between agents, low social costs, or cycling. This implies that the setup of the game itself, as well as the algorithms chosen by the players, has to be done with the potential limiting behavior taken into consideration. Indeed, as learning algorithms are increasingly deployed in markets and other competitive environments, their implementation and the interpretation of their dynamics will become increasingly important.
We remark that this work makes no claims on the existence of Nash equilibria in games, or even on the rate of convergence to limiting behaviors, which are themselves very interesting areas of research. One direction of future research is in developing a better understanding of the geometry of the individual agent strategy spaces, the joint strategy space, and the graphs of the agents' loss functions would, in turn, lead to a better sense of the difficultly of escaping a saddle, and in the case of zero-sum games, the likelihood of not converging to a Nash equilibrium. For instance, it may be possible to extend recent works exploring the rate of escape from saddle points [14, 31] and saddle point geoemtry to the multi-agent setting. Since multi-agent settings admit not only equilibria as critical points, but also limit cyles, there are a number of open questions around the characterization of non-equilibrium limiting behavior: How do we interpret limit cycles? Are they samples from a mixed policy? Does their time-averaged behavior correspond to a Nash equilibrium or an equilibrium in another sense? Another interesting open question is whether certain classes of gradient-based learning algorithms avoid certain dynamics altogether.
In short, multi-agent learning is becoming increasingly important as we move to a more automated society and there are a number of open questions ripe and ready to be answered. This work is a first attempt at characterizing the limiting behavior in a broad class of multi-agent gradient-based learning algorithms.
Appendix A. Genericity of Non-Degenerate Differential Nash
In order to prove genericity of non-degenerate differential Nash, we need some mathematical prelimiaries.
A.1. Preliminaries
Consider smooth manifolds X and Y of dimension n x and n y respectively. An k-jet from X to Y is an equivalence class [x, f, U ] k of triples (x, f, U ) where U ⊂ X is an open set, x ∈ U , and f : U → Y is a C k map. The equivalence relation satisfies [x, f, U ] k = [y, g, V ] k if x = y and in some (and hence any) pair of charts adapted to f at x, f and g have the same derivatives up to order k. We use the notation [x, f, U ] k = j k f (x) to denote the k-jet of f at x. The set of all k-jets from X to Y is denoted by J k (X, Y ). The jet bundle J k (X, Y ) is a smooth manifold (see [28] Chapter 2 for the construction). For each C k map f : X → Y we define a map j k f : X → J k (X, Y ) by x → j k f (x) and refer to it as the k-jet extension.
Definition 17 Let X, Y be smooth manifolds and f : X → Y be a smooth mapping. Let Z be a smooth submanifold of Y and p a point in X. Then f intersects Z transversally at p (denoted f Z at p) if either f (p) / ∈ Z or f (p) ∈ Z and T f (p) Y = T f (p) Z + (f * ) p (T p X).
For 1 ≤ k < s ≤ ∞ consider the jet map j k : C s (X, Y ) → C s−k (X, J k (X, Y )) and let Z ⊂ J k (X, Y ) be a submanifold. Define
A subset of a topological space X is residual if it contains the intersection of countably many opendense sets. We say a property is generic if the set of all points of X which possess this property is residual [11] . The Jet Transversality Theorem and Proposition 19 can be used to show a subset of a jet bundle having a particular set of desired properties is generic. Indeed, consider the jet bundle J k (X, Y ) and recall that it is a manifold that contains jets j k f : X → J k (X, Y ) as its elements where f ∈ C k (X, Y ). Let Z ⊂ J k (X, Y ) be the submanifold of the jet bundle that does not possess the desired properties. If dim X < codim Z, then for a generic function f ∈ C k (X, Y ) the image of the k-jet extension is disjoint from Z implying that there is an open-dense set of functions having the desired properties.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
We prove the theorem for more general smooth manifolds as player strategy spaces, although we are primarily concerned with Euclidean space in this paper. Proof Consider an n-player game where player i's cost function is sufficiently smooth real-valued map on X = X 1 × · · · × X n , i.e. f i ∈ C 2 (X, R), and where dim X i = m i and m = n i=1 m i . Let J 2 (X, R n ) denote the second order jet bundle containing 2-jets j 2 f such that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) : X → R n . Let (U, ϕ) be a product chart on X that contains (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
We define S(m) to be the symmetric m × m matrices as follows
For (A 1 , . . . , A n ) ∈ S(m) n , we can partition each A i as follows. First, consider and S 2 (m) is the set of m × m matrices composed of the remaining block rows of each A i not included in B ∈ S 1 (m). Hence, S 1 (m) is the space corresponding to Dω and S 2 (m) is the space in which matrices constructed from the other pieces of the player Hessians that were excluded in the construction of Dω. Then J 2 (X, R n ) is locally diffeomorphic to
n-times (16) and the 2-jet extension of f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) at a point x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X, namely j 2 f (x), in coordinates is given by (ϕ(x), ((f i • ϕ −1 )(ϕ(x))) i∈I , (Df i (x)) i∈I , (D 2 f i (x)) i∈I ).
Define Z(m) = {A ∈ S 1 (m)| det(A) = 0}.
Z(m) is an algebraic set and hence, admits a canonical Whitney stratification having finitely many algebraic strata (see Chapter 1, Theorem 2.7 of [20] ), i.e. it is the finite union of submanifolds. By its construction, Z(m) has no interior points. Hence, it has co-dimension at least 1. Now, we consider the subset of the jet bundle J 2 (X, R n ) defined by
where 0 R m i is the zero vector in R m i . Note that {0 R m i } has co-dimension m i . Hence, G 1 is the union of submanifolds of co-dimension at least m + 1. By the Jet Transversality Theorem and Proposition 19, since m + 1 > m, for generic f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), the image of the 2-jet extension j 2 f is disjoint from G 1 . Hence, there is an open-dense set of functions f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) such that for each x ∈ X, whenever D i f i (x) = 0 for all i ∈ I (i.e. ω(x) = 0), the derivative of the differential game form has non-zero determinant (i.e. det Dω(x) = 0). Note that the conditions ω(x) = 0 and det(Dω(x)) = 0 are coordinate-invariant. Hence, this result is independent of the choice of chart. Similarly, consider another subset of J 2 (X, R n ) defined by [49] ) Let x 0 be a fixed point for the C r local diffeomorphism f : U → R n where U ⊂ R n is an open neighborhood of x 0 in R n and r ≥ 1. Let E s ⊕ E c ⊕ E u be the invariant splitting of R n into generalized eigenspaces of Dφ(x 0 ) corresponding to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal to one, and greater than one.
To the Dφ(x 0 ) invariant subspace E s ⊕ E c there is an associated local φ-invariant C r embedded disc W cs loc called the local stable center manifold of dimension dim(E s ⊕ E c ) and ball B around x 0 such that φ(W cs loc ) ∩ B ⊂ W cs loc , and if φ n (x) ∈ B for all n ≥ 0, then x ∈ W sc loc .
Consider a general stochastic approximation framwork x t+1 = x t + γ t (h(x t )) + t for h : X → T X with h ∈ C 2 and where X ⊂ R d and where T X denotes the tangent space.
Theorem 21 (Theorem 1 [43] ) Suppose γ t is F t -measurable and E[ t |F t ] = 0. Let the stochastic process {x t } t≥0 be defined as above for some sequence of random variables { t } and {γ t }. Let p ∈ X with h(p) = 0 and let W be a neighborhood of p. Assume that there are constants η ∈ (1/2, 1] and c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 > 0 for which the following conditions are satisfied whenever x t ∈ W and t sufficiently large: (i) p is a linear unstable critical point, (ii) c 1 /t η ≤ γ t ≤ c 2 /t η , (iii) E[( t ·v) + |F t ] ≥ c 3 /t η for every unit vector v ∈ T X, and (iv) t 2 ≤ c 4 /t η . Then P (x t → p) = 0.
Theorem 22 (Theorem 2.1 [7] ) Let ξ ⊂ X be a hyperbolic linearly unstable cycle of h. Assume the following (i) h ∈ C 2 ; (ii) c 1 /t η ≤ γ t ≤ c 2 /t η with 0 < c 1 ≤ c 2 and 0 < η ≤ 1; and (iii) there exists b ≥ 0 such that for all unit vectors v ∈ R m , E[( t · v) + |F t ] ≥ b. Then P (L({x t }) = ξ) = 0.
Corollary 23 (Corollary 2.2 [7] ) Assume that there exists δ ≥ 1 such that n≥0 γ 1+δ n < ∞ and that h is a Morse-Smale vector field. If we denote by {ξ i , i = 1, . . . , l} the set of periodic orbits in X, then l i=1 P (L({x t }) = ξ i ) = 1. Further, if conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 22 hold, then P (L({x t }) = ξ i ) > 0 implies ξ i is linearly stable.
